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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Thomas Lowder entered a conditional guilty plea to a drug offense, reserving his right to
appeal the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress. On appeal, Mr. Lowder asserts
that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence, because there was no
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the van he occupied was being driven contrary to traffic
laws. Mr. Lowder contends that the plain language of I.C. § 49-428(2) does not prohibit his
conduct of driving with the license plate securely shoved between the dashboard and the driver’s
side of the windshield. The deputy saw the license plate once he got closer to Mr. Lowder’s van.
Despite seeing the license plate, the deputy continued with the traffic stop. On appeal,
Mr. Lowder asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion because the deputy lacked
reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop upon seeing the requisite license plate. He
further contends that the traffic law regulating license plates, I.C. § 49-428(2), is void for
vagueness as applied to his conduct of driving with the license plate securely shoved between the
dashboard and the windshield.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s contention that Mr. Lowder conceded
the traffic stop was lawful.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Lowder’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Lowder’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Lowder’s Motion To Suppress
The State asserts that Mr. Lowder abandoned his argument that the stop was unlawful
and that he “appeared to concede” on appeal that the initial traffic stop was lawful. (Resp.
Br., pp.5-10.) However, this is contradicted by the Appellant’s Brief, in which Mr. Lowder
states, “On appeal, Mr. Lowder asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to
suppress evidence, because there was no reasonable and articulable suspicion that the van he
occupied was being driven contrary to traffic laws.” (App. Br., p.1.) Mr. Lowder further argued,
“the stop constituted a seizure in violation of Mr. Lowder’s Fourth Amendment rights as it was
not supported by reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing.” (App. Br., p.7.) He
also stated, “Here, Mr. Lowder asserts there was no reasonable and articulable suspicion that the
van he occupied was being driven contrary to traffic laws, because the placement of the license
plate securely between the windshield and the dashboard complied with I.C. § 49-428(2), the
statute used to justify reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop.” (App. Br., p.8.) Thus, the
State’s claim that Mr. Lowder “appeared to concede” that the initial stop was lawful, is without
merit.
Mr. Lowder contends that the deputy did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate the
traffic stop and that “the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress because Deputy
Payne did not have reasonable suspicion to continue the traffic stop once he saw that the front
license plate on Mr. Lowder’s van was secured and was clearly visible.” (App. Br., p.6.) To the
extent Mr. Lowder’s argument was not clear to the State, in this Reply Brief, Mr. Lowder will
attempt to clarify and explain further his argument.
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Here, Deputy Payne stopped Mr. Lowder because he did not see a front license plate on
the front bumper of Mr. Lowder’s van.1 (9/9/19 Tr., p.7, L.8 – p.8, L.24.) Deputy Payne
testified that he believed a license plate belongs on the center of the front bumper of a vehicle.
(9/19/19 Tr., p.13, Ls.7-15.) However, this belief is an erroneous understanding of the law.
Idaho law does not require a bumper mount. Instead, Idaho Code § 49-428 requires the license
plate to “be securely fastened to the vehicle to which it is assigned to prevent the plate from
swinging, be at a height not less than twelve (12) inches from the ground, measuring from the
bottom of the plate, be in a place and position to be clearly visible, and shall be maintained free
from foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly legible. . . .” I.C. § 49-428(2).
The State bears the burden of proving that an investigatory stop or detention is based on
reasonable suspicion and is limited in its scope and duration to the issue being investigated.
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). “In order to satisfy constitutional standards, an
investigative stop must be justified by a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police, based
upon specific articulable facts, that the person to be seized has committed or is about to commit a
crime.” State v. Sevy, 129 Idaho 613, 615 (Ct. App. 1997). While an officer may rely on his
training and experience in drawing inferences from his observations of the facts, “[t]he Fourth
Amendment requires ‘some minimal level of objective justification’ for making the stop.”
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217
(1984)). “[T]he officer’s observations were limited to those facts which he thought were legally
relevant pursuant to his understanding of the law.” State v. Lacasella, 60 P. 3d 975, 981-82
(Mont. 2002) (citing United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F. 3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2000)). Mr. Lowder

1

Deputy Payne also speculated that he did not see the license plate in the windshield, but he did
“feel as if if [sic] it was visible, I would have seen it in that direction path to the driver.”
(9/19/19 Tr., p.9, Ls.11-21.)
4

asserts that the officer’s mistake of law eliminated any reasonable particularized suspicion for
the traffic stop. See Lacasella, 60 P. 3d at 982 (holding that the fact that there was no license
plate on the bumper of the defendant’s truck provided no objective basis that the law was being
violated, where the pictures of the truck suggest that the officer could have seen the license plate
if he had looked at the window as well as the bumper of the vehicle); see also United States v.
Lopez-Soto, 205 F. 3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that observations made by an officer
who does not understand the law are not objectively grounded in the law and thus, cannot be the
basis for particularized suspicion.); United States v. Twilley, 222 F. 3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir.
2000) (same).
In Lacasella, the Montana Supreme Court reversed the district court order denying
suppression of the results of the traffic stop. Id. 60 P. 3d at 982. The Montana Supreme Court
analyzed Ninth Circuit case law, and reasoned:
Deputy Dominick thought that Montana law required a license plate to be
displayed on Lacasella’s bumper. Furthermore, he believed that the front of the
vehicle was limited to the front bumper and grill of the vehicle. Based on this
misunderstanding, he had no reason to look at Lacasella’s windshield for a license
plate and the State produced no evidence that he did.
The data upon which particularized suspicion was founded in this case was
gathered based upon a clear misapprehension of the law. Deputy Dominick
thought that Montana law required a license plate to be mounted on either the
bumper or the grill of Lacasella’s truck. The State produced no evidence that
Deputy Dominick looked at Lacasella’s windshield. Furthermore, based on his
misunderstanding of the law, Deputy Dominick would have had no reason to look
at the windshield once he determined there was no license plate on the bumper of
the vehicle. However, the fact that there was no license plate on the bumper of
Lacasella’s vehicle provides no objective basis that the law was being violated.
The pictures of the truck suggest that Deputy Dominick could have seen the
license plate if he had looked at the window as well as the bumper of the vehicle.
Lacasella, 60 P.3d at 981–82. In Mr. Lowder’s case, Deputy Payne testified that he looked into
the van to see the driver, and that he believed he would have seen the license plate when he was
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looking at the driver; however, this is insufficient to demonstrate that the deputy looked to the
windshield for the license plate. (9/19/19 Tr., p.9, Ls.11-21.) Further, the picture of the van on
the day of the traffic stop demonstrates that the plate was visible—Deputy Payne would have
been able to see the license plate in the windshield, had he looked for one. (Defense Exh. 1.)
In this case, there was no reasonable and articulable suspicion that Mr. Lowder’s van was
being driven contrary to traffic laws.

Alternatively, as analyzed in his Appellant’s Brief,

Mr. Lowder argues the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the traffic
law at issue, I.C. § 49-428(2), is unconstitutionally vague as applied to his conduct. Under either
argument, the district court should have suppressed any evidence obtained from the unlawful
traffic stop.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Lowder respectfully requests that this Court reverse or vacate the district court’s
order denying his motion to suppress, vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand his case for
further proceedings.
DATED this 19th day of February, 2021.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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